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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
CLARENCE P. MARTIN,

•

Plaintiff and A.ppellarnt,
vs.

Case No.

7766
RALPH L. JONES, dba MOUNT
AIR PHARMACY,
Defendant and RespDndent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACT'S
Appellant's statement of facts, especially the sequence of events, is misleading and does not present a
complete picture of the attending circumstances and
evidence, which necessitates a further statement and
reference to portions of the record.
Defendant's store, 3005 Highland Drive, is located
on the east side of the street facing west. While a portion of the store is classified as semi-self help, such that
customers in that portion of the store are allowed to
handle and pick up merchandise, no such practice was
followed or allowed in other sections, where customers
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

were prohibited, namely, the prescription room, cosmetic counter, soda fountain, liquor bar and cash register. The State Agency liquor bar, soda fountain and
cash register used in connection therewith are located
along the very north side of the store behind a counter
running the entire length east and west completely separating these departments from the self-help portion
of the store, as shown in Exhibit 2. No one could enter
behind these counters without hurdling the counter except through a very narrow aisle or passage eighteen
inches in width between the: counters in front of the
liquor store or bar and soda fountain (R. 65, 173). In
this passageway, intended for employees only, there
was a sign posted "NO ADl\1ITTANCE El\1PLOYEES
ONLY."
Plaintiff denied having seen this siin (R. 47), but
acknowledged that he did ~ot particularly look for it
(R. 67). On his next visit to the store, he said he could
not help seeing it (R. 68). If it was there at the time
of the accident, as defendant's employe:es all testified
it was (R. 147, 148, 160, 166, ·173, 189), then plaintiff
could not have helped seeing it, when he went behind
the counter, had he been observant. Similar signs were
by the prescription counter and rest room doors, etc.
where patrons were not allowed (R. 173, 189).
Plaintiff's Knowledge
Whether plaintiff saw the sign or not, he knew the
situation in the store and the. segregation of the departments above mentioned. He was a mature man, forty-six
years of age, a salesman for Alsco, lived in the immediate
2
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neighborhood and had been in the store a number of
times. He occasionally purchased liquor over the sarne
counter (R. 63). He ad1nitted having on a prior occasion
gone in the prescription department and was ex_pressly
U)arned to keep out. He knew custom.ers were not permitted behind the liquor counter. We quote his testimony fron1 the record:
·~Q.

You had been in the Mount Air Pharmacy
a number of times before November, the 11th
day of November, the day of this accident~

"A.

A number of thnes, yes.

"Q.

And on any of those p·rior occasions had you
ever been behind that liquor counter~

" ..A...

Never been behind it, no.
• * •
Had you ever seen any other patrons behind
that counter, or any one other than the persons who \Vere working there·~

"Q.

"A. I don't remember seeing anyone.

"Q. There were other places in the store where
patrons did not ordinarily go, were there not?
"A.

Yes.

"Q.

You had never been behind the fountain to
the east of the liquor counter~

"A.

No.

"Q. And I think you had been in the prescription
department~

"A.

I was in there one time. Mr. Jones told me
he did not want anyone behind there, so I
went out." (R. 63)
3
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"Q.

S.o, before the accident happened there were
at least three places in the store where you
had never seen any patrons or customers;
behind the liquor counter, and the fountain,
and the prescription department, outside of
the times you were there~ And Mr. Jones
told you not to come behind that prescription counter~
"A. That's right." (R. 64)
* * *
"Q. You had never seen, in your experience
before the night of this accident, the general
public, or individuals, persons who were not
employees, behind counters in liquor stores,
in close proximity to liquor bottles on those
shelves, in any store you had been in~
* * *
"A. No." (R. 68-69)

Concerning the previous difficulty with plaintiff,
Ralph L. Jones, the store manager, testified:
"When he entered behind the prescription
counter 've had to ask hin1 on two or three occasions to please not come back there." (R. 155)
(and Mrs. Ashley R. 189).
So as not to confuse the cash register used for the
fountain and liquor sales (R. 131) located near the west
end of the soda fountain with the other cashier's stand,
used in connection with the self-help area of the store,
perhaps it should be pointed out that the latter was
near the front center of the store in the self-help department, shown Exhibit "F·". It was at this point that plaintiff had completed his original purchase of razor blades
and N.R. tablets before going behind the liquor counter
4
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where customers were not allowed.
From plaintiff's testimony and the whole evidence,
it was undisputed that custo1ners weTe not allowed
behind the liquor and fountain counters, and no customers had been seen there, either by plain tiff or in the
experience of defendant or defendant's clerks during the
several months or years they were emp~loyed (Jones, R.
12±, 127 ; Ashley, R. 188, 189; Cannon R. 172, 173).
The liquor department was closed on the day of the
accident (R. 52).
There was no claim of active negligence against
defendant, the only claim being for passive negligence
or defective premises by reason of the hole or opening
in the floor at the west end of the liquor counter through
which plaintiff fell. This hole was originally made to
accommodate a dumb waiter, but the use of the elevator
as such had been discontinued (R. 156), the opening
being used evenings 'vhen the liquor store was closed so
employees could hoist liquor boxes from the basement
to stock the shelves, and then at convenient times dispose
of the empty cartons ( R. 151, 152, 169, 170).
As shown in Exhibit 2, the pencils, pip·es and other
merchandise on top of the liquor shelves against the wall
were purely for display purposes (R. 126, 139, 140).
These were seven to eight feet above the floor, "\Vhere
most people could not reach (R. 189, 190), defendant
himself reaching on tip toes when he stepped into the
hole (R. 66). It was consideTed good merchandising
that some of the items were removed from the display
cards ( R. 197).
I
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The same pencils were available in other portions
of the store ( R. 181, 191, 192).

Plaintiff's Theory
Knowing customers we-r~ not allowed behind the
liquor counter where he was injured, at the trial plaintiff Martin proceeded upon the theory, based solely on
his own testimony, wherein he claimed that while he
was still at the cashier's register located in the self-help
department, he asked the lady clerk (presumably Mrs.
Ashley or Mrs. Cannon) for a pencil, in response to
which he was ·told, "They are up on top there," referring to the top of the liquor shelves behind. the counter
(R. 43). That he, plaintiff, then proceeded in that direction (R. 44) saying, "I will get one," and that she, the
clerk, followed him over (R. 45) right behind within
two or three feet (R. 47). He could not recall which of
the clerks served him (R. 71, 72).

Conflict in Evidence
In conflict with plaintiff's testimony and theory that
he was effectually directed behind the counter by defendant's employees, the clerks, namely, Mrs. Ashley
and Mrs. Cannon, both testified to the contrary that
Martin had completed his purchase of razor blades and
N.R. tablets, and said nothing whatsoever about wanting
a pencil. They were both busy serving other customers
and neither knew plaintiff intended to do anything but
leave the store until he was apprehended behind the
liquor counter reaching for the display pencils at the
very place where he was injured. When Mrs. Cannon
6
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observed him, she left the eustomer she was then waiting on and went over to get plaintiff, intending to usher
him out from behind the counter as courteously as possible.
The course of events is illustrated by the testimony
of Mrs. Ashley and Mrs. Cannon.
nirs. Ashley """as at the cash register near the front
cente.r of the store (not the cash register behind the
soda fountain) and Mrs. Cannon was near the rear of
the store (R. 171). Mrs. Ashley explained she waited
on plaintiff, Martin, when he came in the store.
"A.

"Q.
"A.
"Q.

"A.

"Q.

I 'vaited on Mr. Martin first, and he apparently had completed his purchase, and then
I waited on the second customer, and then
he interrupted my second customer I was
waiting on to ask me for these particular
tablets at the back of the store, and I was
at the front of the store. !frs. Cannon .was
in the same general depart1nen t, that these
particular tablets were in, waiting on her
customer, so I asked if she would bring up
the tablets with the purchases her customer
had made, which she did.
I understand Mr. ~1artin had completed his
purchases, before he asked for the tablets~
That's right, yes he had.
And did he pay you for the tablets 'vhen
they were brought down to where you and
Mr. Martin were 1
Yes. However, I was still taking care of n1y
customer. I interrupted my customer to finish
Mr. Martin's sale.
And then what happened after that~

7
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"A.

I was waiting on my customer, and as far
as I knew Mr. Martin was completely finished.

"Q. Did Mr. Martin say anything to you about
any pencils~
"A.

No, he did not ask for pencils; he asked for
N.R. tablets only.

"Q. Did he ask you where any fine line pencils
were~

"A.

No, he did not.

"Q. Did you at any time while he was there,
point over to the pencils over the liquor
shelf~

"A.

"Q.

I am not in the habit of doing that; none
of us are.
What was the first thing you knew, or the
first thing that gave you knowledge, the first
intimation you had the accident had happened~

"A. I heard these bottles rattle on the. shelffall off the shelf in the liquor department,
and I had my back to it, and was finishing
the sale to the customer, just ringing the
cash register, and I also heard a groan. He
did not scream, but a noise, and the noise of
the bottles falling, and I turned around and
Mrs. Cannon was standing there with her
.hands in the air and Mr. Martin had fallen."
(R. 186-7)
Mrs. Cannon testified:

"Q. And when was your attention first directed
toward him, and how~
"A.

Well I was waiting on a customer, and l\1rs.
8
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Ashley called to me to bring some tablets
back.
"Q. And in what part of the store were you when
you were waiting on this customer~
''A. I was in the back.
"Q. And where was l\1rs. Ashley~
"A. She 'vas up at the front.
"Q. Was she anywhere near the cash register~
"A. That is where she was.
"Q.. What did you do~
"A. I brought the tablets down and then finished
waiting on my customer I had before that.
"Q. Now did you see l\1r. Martin when you
brought the tablets down~
"A. Yes, I did.
"Q. Where was he~
''A. Down by the cash register.
"Q.. And was he being served by Mrs. Ashley at
that time~
"A. He had purchased something from her, I
think.

"Q. What happened to the tablets you brought
down~ Do you know who they were for; who
got them~
"A. Yes, they were for Mr. Martin.
"Q.

Then what did you do after you left the
tablets there ~
"A. I turned around and saw 1\Ir. Martin standing over behind the liquor counter.
"Q. Where were you when you turned around
and saw him behind the liquor counter~
9
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"A. I was at the cash register.
"Q. And which cash register was that~
"A. The front one.
"Q. And were you still waiting on the customer
you told us about1
"A. I was.
"Q. Did you see l\{r. l\1artin walk from the cash
register over to the place where you saw
him standing behind the liquor counter~
"A. No, I did not. I figured he was through with
his purchases.
"Q. And what did you do when you saw him
over there'
"A. Well, being responsible for the liquor man,
I walked over and asked him if I could help
him.
"Q. And what was he doing~
"A. He had a card of pencils, and he said, 'I want
a pencil.'
"Q. And then what happened?
"A. He got a pencil off the card and then turned
and put the card back on the shelf, and stepped back and fell down the hole." (R. 171-2)
Mrs. c·annon further explained she at times assisted
in the liquor department in stocking the shelves, throwing out boxes and waiting on liquor customers (R. 174).
We quote further from her testimony:
"Q. Mrs. Cannon, did you say anything to Mr.
Martin when you went over there, about not
being behind the liquor counter~
"A. No, we try to be as courteous to the customers as we can.
e do not say, 'You are not

'V
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allowed behind here.' vVe try to get thern
out as nicely as we can.
"Q. You did not ask hiln to leave~
''A. No, I figured on helping hhn and getting
him out as quickly as I could without hurting
his feelings.

''Q.

So in the interest of your employer you
thought there wasn't any necessity of asking
him to come away from that particular area~

"A. As long as I w·as there with him.
"Q. Mrs. Cannon did you warn him of any danger
in that vicinity J?
"A. Well the hole \vas there. I figured he could
see it.
"Q. You could see it~
-'A. And he did not have his back to it.
"Q. He had his face to it~
"A.

He was to the side of it; he was not standing
right by it.

"Q. The light was good so you could see the hole
there~

"A.
"Q.

Yes.
Now then, you said not a word to him about
that~

"A.

No, I didn't.
(R. 179, 180)

I figured he could see it."

* * *
"Q. 11rs. Cannon, were those same pencils and
other merchandise on display on that liquor
shelf, available in the counters in the center
of the store~
"A. Yes, they were.
11
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"Q. And did you know that Mr. Martin was
behind the counter until you turned around
and saw him there~
"A. No, sir. I figured the N .R. tablets were all
he wanted.
"Q. Did you hear him say anything about any
other merchandise when you brought the
N.R. tablets down there~
"A. No, I am positive he did not say anything."
(R. 181)

"Q.

"A.
"Q.
"A.

* * *
And on this occasion you were helping lVfr.
Martin to get his pencil~
No, I d'idn't help him get his pencil. lie
helped himself.
Your purpose in being over there was for
that.
We are responsible for the liquor, as I said
before, and so I went over there and tried
to get him out as nicely as I could." (R. 183)

It is evident from the foregoing that plaintiff was
not actually or impliedly directed by either of the clerks
but he took it upon himself to go behind the counter
where he knew he should not be, and it was not until he
was already to the side of the hole and had obtained
a card of pencils in his hand that Mrs. Cannon went
over in an effort to usher him out. This was in contrast
to plaintiff's testimony that he was directed and accompanied by one of the clerks to his position near the man
hole, where he fell, and that was the substantial controversy and issue governing plaintiff's status as that
of an invitee or trespasser or equivalent when he was

12
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injured. Under such testimony, the jury was entitled to
believe the evidence of defendant that plaintiff did not
ask for a pencil, and that he went behind the counter
of his own volition without defendant's direction or
knowledge.
QUESTION INVOLVED
The only question raised is the giving of the court's
Instruction No. 9 as follows :
"INSTRUCTION 9
''If you find that the aisle behind the liquor
counter was not intended for and was not a
place used by custon1ers and patrons of defendant and was intended and used only as a working
area for use by defendant's employees, and that
plainly visible signs were posted signifying the
area was not for customers, and if you further
find that plaintiff walked behind said counter to
the vicinity of said opening, ·without the direction
or consent of the defendant or his employees,
then you are instructed that in walking behind
said counter, plaintiff was a trespasser and took
the premises as he found them, and defendant
owed him no duty whatever with re.sp,ect to the
existence of the opening, except to not wilfully or
knowingly injure him, and he is not entitled to
recover, and your verdict must be in favor of the
defendant and against the plaintiff, No Cause of
Action." (R. 248) .
The instruction should be considered in light of the
issues and evidence of the parties developed and relied
upon at the trial and in light of all of the instructions
given by the court. The jury was specifically instructed
to consider the instructions as a whole. (See Instruc-

13
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tion 12-A, R. 252). So viewing the instructions, there
was no error as the instructions given substantially and
fairly stated the issues covering plaintiff's theory of
implied consent.
Other Instructions
Instructions Nos. 5 to 8 read as follows:
"IN,STRUCTION 5
"The owner or operator of a retail store
impliedly invites the public to enter upon the
premises to inspect and purchase articles had,
or displayed for sale. Plaintiff was an invitee
in the Mount Air Pharmacy. The invitation which
plaintiff thus impliedly received applied to that
p-art of the store where goods are displayed for
sale and business is ordinarily transacted. It
extends to that part of the premises designed,
adopted and prepared for the accommodation of
customers, and to which customers may reasonably be expected to go; or to which he was
expressly or impliedly given permission to go in
furtherance of the objects or purpo-se for which
he was originally invited to enter the store."
(R. 244)
"INSTRUCTION 6
"It is the duty of the proprietor of a place
of business which is open to public patronage
to use ordinary care to provide reasonably safe
floors, and to make safe for customers such part
of the premises to which the customers have been
expressly or impliedly invited to go." (R. 245)
"INSTRUCTION 7
"If you shall find and believe from a preponderance of the evidence, that plaintiff was
or became an invitee, as defined in Instruction

14
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5, upon that part of the pre1nises where he received his injury, then it becan1e defendant's
duty to use ordinary and reasonable care to make
such part of the premises safe for use by the
plaintiff." (R. 246)
"INSTRUCTION 8
"While plaintiff entered upon defendant's
pre1uises as an invitee, if he on his own volition
went beyond the scope or extent of his invitation,
and 'vent into parts of the premises not covered
by his invitation as defined in Instruction 5, he
there ceased to be an invitee, and at such place
the proprietor owed him the duty only of not
wilfully or knowingly harming him, or wilfully
or knowingly exposing him, or wilfully or kno"\vingly permitting him to expose himself, or to be
exposed, to danger, and to warn him of hidden
dangers known by the proprietor to exist." (R.
247)

These instructions
9 fairly presented the
plaintiff under all of
the scope or extent of
occurred.

considered with Instruction No.
issue to the jury as to whether
the circumstances was beyond
his invitation when the accident

.ARGUMENT
Clearly the scope of the original invitation in this
case did not extend to plaintiff Martin's conduct when
(after his purchases were completed and wrapped and
paid for in the self-help department) he went without
the consent, knowledge or direction of defendant or
defendant's employees behind the counter of the State.
Liquor Agency, where he, Martin, knew customers were
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not allowed or served. It was a place reserved for
defendant's employees and not a place where customers
were reasonably anticipated or expected to go.
Of his own volition, plaintiff left the vicinity where
customers were served and went through the narrow
passage behind the counter, ignoring or not observing
the posted sign, and walked fifteen to eighteen feet,
practically the entire length of the liquor counter, and
had already obtained on tip toes a card of pencils,
exhibited for display, from above the liquor shelves.
These shelves were seven or eight feet fro1n the floor,
where most people could not even reach without the
aid of a stool or ladder.
When Mrs. Cannon, leaving the customer she 'vas
waiting on, went to retrieve him as courteously as she
could, he was already there, and in that position in the
very location where he stepped into the hole. He was
already a trespasser or equivalent when she arrived.
It was not through Mrs. Cannon!s act, or any of the
clerks, that he became a trespasser or that he was induced into the very position where he fell.
What approach to the situation could be taken by
any of the clerks was a problem created by plaintiff's
own wrongful conduct in going there. When plaintiff was
already there with pencils in hand, it was not required,
or necessary of Mrs. Cannon, at least upon first approach, or first utterance to try to force or order plaintiff out at the risk that such approach might be. interpreted as an attitude of accusation or suggestive that
plaintiff did not intend to pay for the display mer-
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chandise he held.
It should be remembered it 'vas by reason of plaintiff's trespass that l\Irs. C~annon was faced with the
problem of ushering him out as tactfully as she could.
She had no authority to per1nit plaintiff, or any customer, to go or ren1ain behind the counter, and the fact
that she approached the situation in a courteous manner
should not operate to relieve plain tiff of his trespass
or wanderings into the very position where he felL
Even had plaintiff been im1nediately ordered out,
there is no assurance he 'vould have obeyed or that he
would not have fallen, or that he would not have in any
event taken sufficient time to have reached up on the
top of the shelves, seven or eight feet, to replace the
card, as he did do the very moment he stepp·ed back
and into the hole. He had previously ignored the posted
signs and warnings given on two or three prior occasions, 'vhen he went inside the prescription room, and
there is no assurance that he, plaintiff, would have
heeded an immediate order to return to the store proper.
Furthermore, there had not really been sufficient time
or opportunity to courteously extricate plaintiff, when
he fell, while reaching to replace the card which he had
removed from the shelf.
There was no advantage to defendant in plaintiff's
being behind the counter and trespassing as he did.
Pencils were available in the self-help portion of the
store proper where customers were allowed. Any purchase of pencils could have been properly solicited there,
or if plaintiff desired to look at the pencils displayed
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above the liquor shelves, he had only to ask one of the
clerks for permission to examine them. This did not
require his going behind the counter. Other customers
did not.
We submit that the conduct of Mrs. Cannon in
attempting to get him out o'f there as quickly as possible
could not in any sense of the word be sufficient to convert
plaintiff from the status of trespasser.
Even if there was any for1n of implied permission,
plaintiff would under the circumstances still be no n1ore
than a permissive licensee, and plaintiff could not recover because there is no duty on the part of a store
owner to "keep his property safe for * * * mere licensees." S.ee Collins v. Sprague's Benson Pharmacy, 124
Neb. 210, 245 N.W. 602. The instruction, therefore, could
not in any sense be termed prejudicial in not specifically
embracing the term "licensee." The principal issues
joined as shown by the evidence were before the. jury,
and the instruction substantially and clearly set forth
the issue of whether plaintiff was a trespasser.
There was no active negligence or claim of active
negligence on the part of defendant. The only claim
was passive negligence or defective premises, and plaintiff's injuries were precipitated either by his own negligence or his own trespass in to the portion of the store
not designed or intended for customers.
Unless the jury accepted plaintiff's theory presented
at the trial therefore, namely, that he, plaintiff, asked
for a pencil at the counter in the self-help department
and was thereafter directed and accompanied by a clerk
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into the location and position where he fell behind the
counter, then plaintiff was a trespasser or equivalent
in going where he knew he was not supposed to go. If
any conduct along the 'vay, or at any time could have
amounted to an invitation, such theory was liberally
set forth in the Court's Instructions 5 to 7 inclusive,
which should be constr~ted together with the Court's
Instruction No. 9, and in light of the theories of the
parties as presented at the trial.
AUTHORITIES
It is significant that the .instruction complained of
states the la'v as defined by Paragraphs 329, 330 and 332
of the Restatement of the Law of Torts, quoted In Re
Wimmer's Estate, 111 Utah 444, 182 Pac. (2d) 119, se);
forth page 11, Appellant's Brief, as follows:
"A trespasser is defined as a 'person who
enters or remains upon land in possession of
another 'vithout a privilege to do so created by
the possessor's consent, or otherwise.' "
The la'v is well established that:
"One who enters the premises of another as
a trespasser or mere licensee does so a.t his own
risk, and the owner owes him no duty to keep·
the premises in a safe condition. His only duty
is to abstain from wanton or wilful injury. Giannini v. Campodonico, 176 Cal. 548, 169 P. 80;
Schmidt v. Bauer, 80 Cal. 565, 22 P. 256, 5 L.R.A.
580; Herzog v. Hemphill, 7 Cal. App. 116, 93 P.
899; Brown v. Pepperdine, 53 Cal. App. 334, 200
P. 36; Roberts v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 102
Cal. App. 422·; 283 P. 353; Kirkpatrick v. Dami19
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ankes, supra ; Koppelman v. Ambassador Hotel
Co., supra." Demmer v. City of Eureka (Cal.),
178 Pac. (2d) 472.
See also Robbins v. Yellow Cab (Cal.), 223 Pac. (2d)
80.
See also Bird v. Clover Leaf-Harris Dairy, 102 Utah
330, 125 Pac. (2d) 797, wherein Justice Wolfe says :
"The owner was under no duty to keep his
proprty safe for trespassers or mere licensees.''
The opinion of the leading case of Bird v. Clover
Leaf-Harris Dairy, supra, is not long, and so we here
quote the principal portion of the opinion:
"A question involved is this: Did the parking
of the automobile under the canopy change the
status of the one who parked it there from that
of an invitee to that of a licensee, so far as
injuries to the automobile as a result of being
in that particular position are concerned' If a
licensee, plaintiff is not entitled to recover in this
case·.
"The automobile was parked there by Mr.
Bird's son, Montell. The latter tested milk for
the Federated Milk Producers on the Dairy premises. There is no question about his being an
invitee so far as his duties were concerned. However the use of the automobile was not necessary
to those duties. Its use "\Vas a matter of convenience to himself in going to and from work.
Sometimes he used a bicycle.
"The dairy furnished ample parking space
for workers and visitors to the· plant. Montell
did not park in this space, although he knew of
it. The reason he gave for parking where he did
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is that he saw other cars parked there and did not
know that it was not to be used as a parking
place. The canopy was in two parts : an east
and a west. The \vest part covered entrances to a
garage or barn where the company delivery
trucks were stored 'vhen not in use. The east
part covered the side of the garage used for
repair purposes. There 'vere no entrances here.
Under this .part of the canopy the company
parked its trucks when they were in need of
repair. It does not appear that !1:ontell Bird
knew of this fact, although he had worked there
more than a year. It was against company orders
to park cars other than delivery trucks under
the canopy any place; but the employees disobeyed this order and parked under the east
'ving of the canopy. It does not appear that
~fontell Bird kne\v of these company orders.
"On the day of the accident some of the Hmployees had parked their automobiles, contrary
to orders, under the east "\Ving of the canopy.
Their machines, too, were injured when the canopy and wall fell. 1\fontell had parked his father's
automobile under the west "\ving directly in front
of sliding doors closing an entrance to one of
the storage places for delivery trucks. According to his testimony he did so because he assumed
from seeing other cars parked under the canopy
that such space could be so used. He knew, however, that trucks would have to be stored there
later in the day, but he expected to be away before they came.
"We believe his assumption was unwarranted. Even though the parking of automobiles under the east canopy where there were no doors,
might have misled the uninitiated into believing
that such space was intended for general parking
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purposes, it is rather a stretch of reasoning to
believe that the space in front of the garage doors
was intended for parking purposes. That is not
common sense. The very fact that there were
doors here was a warning that it was not a parking place. The fact that the other cars were
parked under the canopy at places where there
were no doors would impress the average person
with the thought that the garage entrance should
be left clear.
"We believe plaintiff's case is founded upon
a fallacy. An invitee must use the owner's premises in the usual, ordinary, and customary way.
20 R.C.L. 68, Sec. 59. It cannot be said that to
shut off the owner's use of its garage is the usual,
ordinary, and customary way contemplated for
the public. When Montell Bird so parked, he became, so far as parking the car was concerned,
at best a mere licensee, and took that part of the
premises as he found them.

".,* * * It may be· laid down as a general rule
that the liability of the owner of the premises extends no further than the invitation.' 14 L.R.A.,
N.S., 1119, and cases therein cited. See also, 17
Ann. Cas. 591.
"As to the duty to a licensee see 20 R.C.L. 57,
Sec. 53.
"This disposes of the case. We shall not discuss the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The judgnlent of the lower court is vacated and set aside,
and the case ren1anded with directions to the
lower court to enter a judgment of no cause of
action."
When the evidence in the instant case is undisputed
that customers were not permitted behind the counter,
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and none "~ere kno,vn to have indulged in such practice,
and plaintiff adn1ittedly kne'v he was not permitted there
and previously 'varned "Then in the prescription depa.rtnlent, certainly the instant case presents a stronger cas~
against plaintiff than the Bird case, where the court held
as a n1atter of la'v that plaintiff was not entitled to recover.
This distinction also differentiates the instant case
from the situation suggested by Justice Wolfe in his
dissenting opinion, wherein he points out at pages 334-5
of the Utah Report that:
"Where custom, necessity or other circumstances are such that an invitee may reasonably
presume that the invitation held out to him to
come on the premises includes one's vehicle which
he might ordinarily be expected to use in reaching
the premises, he 1nay place the vehicle on such
portion of the pre1nises during the period of his
inviteeship as is not specifically or by apparent
circumstances excluded from the scope of the invitation."
and suggests further on down the sa1ne page that the
owner should refrain under such circumstances "from
committing active negligence when he is aware of the
trespasser's negligence."
In the instant case, the area behind the counter was
specifically and by apparent circun1stances excluded
from the scope of in~tation. Other customers did not
use the portion of the store sectioned off by the counters,
and plaintiff was there wholly without reason or excuse.
There was no active negligence.
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The case of Hayward v. Downing, et al, 112 Utah
508, 189 Pa.c. (2d) 442, referred to pages 12-14 Appellant's Brief, is clearly distinguishable from the instant
case in that the plain tiffs in that case, watching a wrestling match at the coliseum, were sitting on a platform
and in a place where they had express permission to sit
and where they and other patrons had sat throughout
the course of the winter. "As usual, they had purchased
tickets and had secured permission from Mr. Downing to
sit there." The court made it clear the holding was
"limited strictly to the facts." The opinion is helpful
in relation to the instant case in reference to custon1ers
upon store premises, wherein the court stated as follows:
"A person may be an invitee as to a part of
the premises, and a mere licensee or trespasser
as to other parts of the premises. A common example of this is a store. As a general rule the
public is invited to enter the store for the purpose
of transacting business. However, this invitation
ordinarily extends only to that part of the store
where goods are displayed for sale and business
is ordinarily transacted. Generally, the public is
not invited to enter the stockrooms, furnace
rooms, and other parts of the store, and if persons
go to these parts of the premises they lose their
status as invitees and become mere licensees or
trespassers. 38 Am. J ur. 761. Negligence, Sec.
100. See also Lawand v. California Products Co.,
9 Cal. App. (2d) 147, 48 P. 2d 979."
Plaintiff's position behind the counter was not a
place where business was ordinarily conducted or where
any customers were allowed. It was comparable to the
prescription room, stock roon1s, furnace rooms, or other
24
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parts of the store 'vhere custotuers 'vere not served.
In Oettinger v. Stewart, et al, 24 Cal. (2d) 133, 148
Pac. (2d) 19, referred to page 12 Appellant's Brief,
plaintiff called at defendant's apartment house in Santa
l\fonica to rent an apartn1ent. As she, plaintiff, was leaving the premises, defendant, according to plaintiff's
testimony, in stepping do,vn caught her foot and fell for'vard, striking plaintiff and knocking her, plaintiff, down.
The court held plaintiff 'vas an invitee as a matter of
law, inasmuch as the scope of the original invitation included her right to leave the premises. While the court
did criticize some of defendant's requested instructions,
which in effect stated that if plaintiff became a "'licensee,' the only duty to her then is to refrain from wilful or wanton injury." The reason for such criticism,
however, was based upon some decisions which apply a
rule of reasonable care where the negligence of defendant
is active as distinguished from a defective condition of
the premises. In the latter instance, the court pointed
out the uniform rule that the only duty to a licensee "is
to abstain from wilful or wanton injury."
Again we point out that the instant case, being one
of defective condition of the premises, the only duty even
if plaintiff could be deemed a licensee was to not wilfully
or wantonly injure, as the trial court in substance instructed.
The case of Skerl v. Willow Creek Coal Co., 92 Utah
474, 69 Pac. (2d) 502, page 11 Appellant's Brief, is distinguishable from the instant case in that the children
were clearly invited into the mine in the first instance.
After getting inside, serious injuries 'vere inflicted due
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to a powder explosion. The invitation was extended by
Glen Jackson, one of defendant's employees, who had
charge of the cutting and remo:val of the coal from the
mine, and with the tacit approval of a Mr. Howard, president, at the entrance, who had charge of outside operations. Jackson, in the course of his duties had taken
others through the mine. While the evidence offered by
defendant to the effect that plaintiff was warned not to
go in pres en ted a conflict, the court held that there was
sufficient evidence for the jury to find there was implied,
if not actual permission. In the instant case, if there
was any evidence of implied permission, as we have seen,
plaintiff's theory was fully and adequately presented to
the jury.
In Wimmer v. Bamberger R. Co., 111 Utah 444, 182
Pac. (2d) 119, from which appellant quoted page 11 of
his brief, the court said :
"A brief reference to the facts will disclose
that the deceased when he attempted to retrieve
his hat was either a trespasser or a business visitor. The controlling element in determining his
status was whether or not under the facts of this
case the deceased was invited or permitted to go
upon the car at the tim~ he met his death. If at
the time wnd place he was not privileged to get
on the car, then he would be a trespasser."
In Trafford v. Hammacher, Schlemmer & Co., Inc.,
71 N.Y.S. (2d) 878, a judgment in favor of plaintiff was
reversed. The substance of the case is contained in the
following quotation:
"The defendant supplied main and adequate
aisles for the use of customers. It was under no
duty to anticipate a customer would deviate there26
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front and use the very small, short passageway
intended for the use of its en1ployees in arranging
the rugs. Plaintiff's deviation and use of the
small passage\vay '"a8 her voluntary act, and in
doing so, she "Tas guilty of contributory negligence, if negligence there 'vas."
In Francis v. Cleveland Drug Co., (N. C.) 55 S. E.
(2d) 499, a judg~nent of non-suit was sustained where
plaintiff, a patron at a drugstore, after seeing so1ne one,
not an employee of defendant, go to a refrigerator in a
small storage roo1n adjoining the prescription roorn and
get a Coca Cola, proceeded to do like\vise, and in undertaking to place the en1pty bottle on a shelf, fell into an
open stairway. The roon1 not being for the accommodation of customers and not being invited therein, plaintiff could not recover.

Plaintiff's Own Negligence
\vnatever his status when plantiff undertook to go
behind the liquor counter, a place he knew customers
did not go, and walked 13-15 feet, the entire length to the
vicinity of the man hole, he had a duty to take heed and
observe the floor and the path he was taking. Even a
casual observation would have revealed its presence.
1\frs. Cannon saw it, and she thought plaintiff saw it.
Light meter tests taken adn1ittedly under the same conditions around the hole and Inoulding showed readings
up to ten foot candles as to the north half or portion of
the hole, and approxi1nately five foot candles on the extreme south edge, which was shaded by the counter. The
major portion of the hole, therefore, was substantially
better lighted than the amount of light reconnnended for
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hotel lobbies or school corridors, namely, five foot candles (R. 201, 202). There was plenty of light to easily
see the hole ( R. 203).
Plaintiff was either negligent in not looking and
observing, or in the other alternative, knowing the hole
was there, carelessly stepping back and into the hole.
Reaching on his tip toes attempting to replace the display card, the latter seems probable.
In Knox v. Snow, ______ Utah ______ , 229 Pac. (2d) 874,
plaintiff, while on defendant's service station for business purposes, undertook to look over some tires on a
rack on the far end of the shop, and while doing so, stepped or slipped into the grease pit. Deeming it not necessary to decide the issue of defendant's negligence or
plaintiff's status, this court affirmed defendant's motion
for a non-suit solely on the· basis of plaintiff's own negligence. The court pointed out that plaintiff was required
"to pay some heed to the floor of the shop and the path
he traveled."
In Thompson v. Bea.rd & Gabelman, (Kan.) 216 Pac.
(2d) 798, plaintiff was a customer in defendant's dress
shop having selected two dresses, and at the direction of
a sales lady, then busy serving another customer, went
to a fitting room at the rear of the store. There we-re
two curtained doorways and plaintiff entered, thinking
she had the fitting room, and found herself in a small
office containing a chair and a desk with a lighted lamp
upon it. Noticing the door slightly ajar and thinking it
was the fitting room there, she entered, but advanced
only a few steps when she fell down the stairs sustaining
the injuries for which she brought the action. The court
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held the evidence \vas not sufficient on which to establish
a cause of action. Plaintiff's own contributory negligence
and the further reason as stated by the court at page 802
as follows:
"It cannot be said that defendant. failed to
exercise ordinary care for the safety of its customers by failing to anticipate that some customer
might 'vander from the main part of the store
into that portion of the premises not adapted to
customer's use but reserved for the management
and its employees."
CONCLUSION
If plaintiff was not a trespasser or licensee or contributorily negligent as a n1atter of law, which we submit
he was, then 1nost certainly the verdict is sup·ported by
substantial and convincing evidence, and the instructions
based upon the theory of both parties in the light of the
testimony given at the trial and the existing circumstances, on the whole fairly presented sttch isswes, wnd
taken as a whole were favorable to plaintiff.
It should be remembered plaintiff was injured by
reason of his own voluntary conduct in getting behind
the counter where he knew customers were not permitted.
He ignored previous warnings.
All presumptions should be in favor of affirming
the verdict and judgment.
Respectfully submitted,
STEWART, CANNON & HANSON
E. F. BALDWIN, JR.
Attorneys for Defendant
and Respondent
520 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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